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by Kurt Campbell and Jeffrey W. Legro 
Winston Churchill's characterization of the Soviet Un-
ion as a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma 
may overstate Western understanding of the USSR's 
national security decision-making. The evidence in this 
domain is sparse, and what we do have is incomplete. 
Indeed, the Soviets have taken extraordinary steps to 
maintain the black box that shields how and why their 
decisions are made. With these caveats in mind, knowl-
edge of Soviet decision-making can be summed up in a 
few general statements. First, the Soviet leadership is an 
integrated political-military body, where political au-
thority is dominant, but where the professional military 
retains an important influence. Second, the role of 
institutions and individuals varies within and between 
leaderships, according to the issue under consideration 
(e.g., doctrine, procurement, etc.), and between times 
of peace and war. The potential for evolution in the 
roles of institutions is particularly apparent in the cur-
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rent period of "perestroika." Gorbachev has initiated 
changes that appear to be aimed at transforming the 
security decision-making apparatus. Finally, the histori-
cal record of decision-making in superpower crises in-
dicates that the Soviet Union has been very cautious in 
confrontations with the United States, a tendency that 
need not prove true in future clashes. 
The Actors 
The General Secretary, the Politburo, the Defense 
Council, and the General Staff represent the core of the 
national security apparatus. The Communist Party 
dominates life in the Soviet Union and the Politburo is 
its executive council. The Politburo, now composed of 
twelve full (voting) and eight candidate (non-voting) 
members, is headed by the General Secretary (Mikhail 
Gorbachev). 
The Defense Council links politicians and the military 
at the highest level and is thought to act as a powerful 
subcommittee of the Politburo, dealing with national 
security issues on a day-to-day basis. This shadowy body, 
which has been reconfigured several times since World 
War II, is chaired by the General Secretary and is 
believed to include the minister of defense, the minister, 
of foreign affairs, the KGB chief, and the chairman of 
the Council of Ministers (the head of the official govern-· 
ment administrative body), among others. Its rnembed 
have greater access to intelligence and military infor: 
mation than do other members of the Politburo and 
thus this council importantly shapes most national se: 
curity issues. 
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The General Staff, the command organ of the mili-
tary services, is organizationally under the direction of 
the Ministry of Defense but has direct ties to the De-
fense Council. In contrast with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
it is headed by one man (Army General Moiseyev) and 
has more power over the five individual military services 
(ground forces, air forces, strategic rocket forces, air 
defense troops, and navy). 
Leadership Change and Issue Areas 
The role of these different actors in decision-making 
varies with the power of the leader and with the type of 
issue under consideration. 
The power of the General Secretary vis-a-vis his col-
leagues has tended to fluctuate over time. Usually the 
leader builds increasing authority as his tenure in office 
lengthens (Khrushchev is an important exception here). 
As his power grows, the General Secretary is increas-
ingly able to act independently of his colleagues on the 
Politburo, and his individual style and preferences will 
have a greater influence on decisions. 
The decision-making style and substance. of different 
leaderships has also varied considerably. For example, 
the military under Brezhnev had much greater auton-
omy and authority in its duties than was the case in the 
Stalin and Khrushchev periods. With Marshal Grechko's 
ascendance to full membership on the Politburo in 
1973, the professional military had a direct say in the 
highest decision-making body of the Soviet Union. To-
day the military is again being dominated by the aggres-
sive political leadership of Gorbachev. In light of the 
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decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, the conclusion 
of the INF treaty, and the unceremonious firing of 
high-ranking generals in the wake of the young German 
Mathias Rust's feat of landing a small plane in Red 
Square, and the unilateral reduction of the armed 
forces, speculation about military unhappiness with the 
Gorbachev leadership may be justified. 
Decision-making power is not only a product of insti-
tutional affiliations, but of personalities as well. As the 
case of Marshal Ogarkov illustrates, a forceful individ-
ual with clearly articulated views can have a significant: 
impact on policy. Although Ogarkov was removed in 
1988 from his position as Chief of the General Staff, hi11 
stress on the need for technological improvements ifl 
the Soviet conventional force posture has had a lastin~ 
influence. 
Another key determinant of the decision-makini 
process is the specific issue under consideration. The 
four most important issue areas are doctrine, force 
structure and procurement, arms control, and crisis 
management. 
1. Doctrine. Military doctrine in the Soviet Union has 
two distinct levels: the "socio-political" and the "military-
technical." The dominant socio-political level consideiS 
the nature, objectives, and initiation of war and is di<:-
tated exclusively by the Party leadership. The subordi-
nate military-technical level deals with assessing t)je 
threat, force structure, strategy, and troop preparatiofl, 
and has traditionally been considered the realm <)f 
military professionals. There is an inherent tensic>n 
between these two levels, as the socio-political level 
stresses war prevention, while the military-technical le-~'el 
emphasizes war preparation, particularly the principles 
of surprise, initiative, and preemption. 
The Soviet military wields significant influence ue-
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cause of its traditional monopoly on military expertise 
and information. There has been no civilian structure, 
such as the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, that 
parallels the military command. No institution, except 
in limited aspects the KGB, is able to challenge the 
military's interpretation of strategic requirements and 
planning needs or its estimates of the size and nature of 
military threats. Thus, despite having no formal vote in 
the major decision-making bodies, the military retains 
an important de facto authority. Gorbachev may be 
attempting to reduce this authority by, among other 
things, shifting oversight authority for defense budget 
matters to a standing Committee on Military Affairs, 
established in the new Soviet Parliament, and encour-
aging more open debate on national security issues. 
Over the past two decades, the military's monopoly in 
the realm of strategic nuclear weapons has weakened 
somewhat as scientists and civilian analysts have begun 
to take part in policy matters, much the same way U.S. 
civilians did in the 1950s. In matters of conventional 
warfare, the monopoly remains largely intact. However, 
in this area, too, there have been indications under the 
Gorbachev leadership that the civilian role will be in-
creased. 
2. Force Structure and Procurement. The political lead-
ership ·oversees all decisions and is probably directly 
involved with questions pertaining to major systems, 
especially weapons that require significant resources. 
Most requests for new weapons originate with the indi-
vidual military services and are assessed and rational-
ized by the General Staff. As weapons have become 
technologically more sophisticated, the academy of sci-
ences and top science advisors have assumed increasing 
importance in weapons acquisition and R&D investment 
decisions. 
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3. Anns Control. Decision-making in arms control is 
similar to deliberations on doctrine except that civilians 
outside the top leadership have a more prominent role. 
The chief Soviet negotiators have historically been sen-
ior foreign ministry officials. Despite the military's ef-
forts to deny information to even these diplomats, their 
role has grown as a function of their experience and the 
necessarily political nature of the arms control process. 
Under Gorbachev, the now ex-Chief of the General 
Staff, Marshal Akhromeyev, has played a key part in 
arms control negotiations at summit meetings. In this 
role, it is unclear whether he is a personal emissary of 
Gorbachev, the official representative of military inter-
ests whose say is crucial, or both. Other civilian partici-
pants in the arms control process include analysts in 
academic research institutes that study the \\est, whose 
knowledge has been applicable to the ongoing negotia-
tions with the U.S. and its allies. Finally, scientists have 
become influential because of the crucial link between 
rapidly changing technology and national security af-
fairs. 
4. Crisis Management. Decision-making in a crisis will 
depend on the severity of the situation and the time 
frame available for choice. For example, in the case of a 
surprise attack, the General Secretary would make the 
launch decision on his own authority; the Soviets have 
their own equimlent to the U.S. President's "nuclear 
football," a briefcase with nuclear release codes which 
accompanies their leader. And in the case of a plane 
intruding into Soviet airspace, the top political leader-
ship might not be contacted at all-as is purported to, 
have been the case with KAL 007-and the plane could 
be shot down according to standard operating proce-
dures. 
There is no question that political officials have the 
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exclusive authority to release nuclear weapons for use. 
Soviet leaders are extremely concerned about un-
authorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, and 
they have gone to extensive lengths to prevent it. In the 
early days of the nuclear era, warheads were kept sepa-
rate from delivery systems and were under the control 
of the KGB. Today, missiles of the strategic rocket forces 
are equipped with multiple key systems (which the U.S. 
calls permissive action links, PALs), and it is likely that 
Soviet submarines also have some sort of external con-
trol device. In the case of tactical nuclear weapons held 
outside the Soviet Union, nuclear charges are still 
housed separately in special ammunition storage areas. 
It is probable that the KGB, with its own communica-
tions network, continues to play a role in the control of 
nuclear weapons. 
As in the day-to-day formulation of national security 
policy, the locus of crisis decision-making is the Defense 
Council. This body appears to be a peacetime analogue 
of the State Defense Committee, a unified political-
economic-military leadership organ which assumed su-
preme command of the country in World War II (and 
would do so again if war breaks out). Despite the explicit 
dominance of civilian political officials in the Defense 
Council, the military can have a significant implicit influ-
ence. The nature of a conflict situation demands exper-
tise in military affairs and, in this realm, the prof es-
sional soldiers by and large have exclusive authority. 
Because the General Staff acts as a secretariat for the 
Defense Council, it is also able to shape the agenda and 
decisions. More directly, the military is tasked to make 
a timely determination of an outbreak of hostilities and 
a potential enemy missile strike. Such a judgment would, 
of course, have an important impact in a crisis. This 
impact is of particular concern given the military's em-
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phasis on offensive operations, especially the key role of 
preemption should a large-scale nuclear exchange ap-
pear imminent. Although Gorbachev's "new thinking" 
in national security affairs has denounced preemption 
and promised to upgrade the importance of defense in 
Soviet strategic thought, the results in this area remain 
unclear. 
History of Soviet Decisions on Nuclear Weapons 
in Crises 
The historical record-albeit a very limited and 
opaque one-is somewhat at odds with an image of tht-
Soviet leadership as an integrated political-military com-· 
mand where an offensive-minded military has consid·· 
erable influence. One might expect from such a leader·· 
ship a skillful manipulation of the armed forces fof 
political purposes and a military able to tilt the waf 
prevention/war preparation dilemma in favor of seizinp 
the initiative. In practice, however, the Soviet leadershif 
has been extremely cautious regarding the use of forcie 
in the few superpower crises that have occurred (thie 
Cuban missile crisis and the 1973 Middle East War are 
the most notable). Readiness levels of the Strategic 
Rocket Forces have never been raised as a means df 
demonstrating resolve. Furthermore, from what little 
we know, the military has not been particularly eager t0 
advocate use of force in crises with the U.S. 
This record should not suggest that we can expect tHe 
USSR to roll over in future clashes. Most of our evidenc:e 
on Soviet crisis behavior comes from a period when tl':e 
U.S. enjoyed overwhelming nuclear superiority. This Is 
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no longer the case. Such a change, however, does not 
mean that future Soviet decisions in crises will err on 
the side of war preparation and initiation. -The Soviets 
are still constrained by a desire to avoid nuclear war and 
a uniquely disadvantageous geo-political situation. In 
any conflict, especially those involving nuclear weapons, 
the USSR is surrounded by potential adversaries, not 
the least of which is China. As Brezhnev has asserted, 
"There are two camps of nuclear weapons: those in the 
USSR and those aimed at the USSR." Soviet decisions in 
crises will be driven by a number of factors, including 
the composition of the particular leadership, the inter-
national and regional balance of forces, and the specific 
interests at stake. As these factors vary, so too will policy 
choices. 
Conclusion 
Soviet national security decisions are made by an elite 
group of political and military Communist Party offi-
cials. The nature of the decision-making process can 
vary with the power of the General Secretary, the partic-
ular issue confronted, and the relative state of peace 
and war. Political authority is dominant, yet the military 
retains an important influence through its near-exclu-
sive expertise in matters of armed conflict. The Gor-
bachev leadership has indicated a desire to weaken this 
monopoly by establishing alternative sources of military 
planning and threat analysis, but the fate of such efforts 
remains uncertain. Finally, the history of Soviet deci-
sions in superpower crises indicates that the USSR's 
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leaders are hesitant to risk the possibility of a major 
conflict, especially a nuclear war, with the United States. 
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